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Abstract
Infrastructure operation in the UK can be described as separate utility systems provisioning
unconstrained demand, with higher throughput corresponding to higher profits. A more sustainable
approach would prioritise coordinated infrastructure operation focused on essential service delivery
at the lowest possible resource use. However, the presiding policy paradigm reinforces the current
regime to such an extent that it constrains the necessary transition to a more sustainable
infrastructure system.
This paper combines the findings of existing case study research with insights from theories of multi-
level governance, co-evolution and institutional dynamics to improve our understanding of how
governance systems could accelerate the transition to more resource efficient, service-oriented
infrastructure operation.
We develop a governance analysis framework to improve the understanding of this transition and in
particular the role that governance might take in managing its acceleration. The framework allows
analysts to identify elements or relationships that are absent from a system of interest or that are
constrained by the current governance system. This can be used to identify alternative approaches
to governance that remove barriers to transitions or enable the creation of a necessary element and
accelerate desirable transitions.
1. Introduction
Our physical infrastructure – the system of energy, transport, communication, water, waste and
flood protection assets – is a means to an end; it is built, maintained and expanded in order to
enable the functioning of society and the economy. However, current infrastructure systems are
ageing and cannot provide the adaptable, low carbon services required to respond to demographic
and climatic change (CST 2009a). Sustainable, secure and equitable infrastructure systems will
require rapid, systemic transformation of both physical and institutional systems.
The present form of infrastructure operation can be described as separate utility supply systems
provisioning unconstrained demand, with higher throughput volumes corresponding to larger
economic revenue. Furthermore there is often little incentive for end-user savings, for example in
the UK, the majority of water and waste services are unmetered. This is both risky and ultimately
unsustainable. Unlimited growth in demand means unlimited pressures on ecosystems and natural
resources; at a time when we are already well beyond our planetary safe operating space
(Rockström et al. 2009). From the perspective of societal resilience and security of supply, a system
which understands and manages demand is much more secure than one of unlimited dependence
on external, most often imported and sometimes scarce, inputs (Foresight 2011).
2There has been extensive research into technology improvements or behaviour changes that could
result in joint resource and cost savings (Cullen, Allwood, and Borgstein 2011; Lovins 1985).
However, despite such cost-saving technologies and resource efficiencies existing, they are not
implemented as part of the business-as-usual incentives of market economies (Cullen, Allwood, and
Borgstein 2011). Furthermore, innovation and adoption of demand management (end-use)
technologies tends to be marginalised in comparison with supply side (generation) technology
(Wilson et al. 2012). A new approach is needed to accelerate adoption of resource efficient
technologies and behaviours.
One approach proposed to overcome many of the barriers to efficiency is the idea of a “performance
economy” or “functional economy” (Mont and Tukker 2006; Stahel 2010; Steinberger, van Niel, and
Bourg 2009). In parallel, similar ideas developed from the business and marketing perspective
(Grönroos 2011; Vargo and Lusch 2008). These ideas require a fundamental shift: away from selling
products or metered quantities of infrastructure products (such as electricity, gas or water), and
towards selling “services”: which can be defined as the ultimate goal of the product or utility
purchase (such as thermal comfort, illumination or motive power). Studies investigating Energy
Service Companies (ESCos) agree on the beneficial nature of ESCo operation for the implementation
of energy and cost-efficient technologies (Hannon, Foxon, and Gale; Westling 2003; Marino,
Bertoldi, and Rezessy 2010; Sorrell 2007). However, they also agree on the huge obstacles to
mainstreaming the ESCo business model, from regulation to lack of information and training to risk
sharing. Left to the market, the adoption of these business models has lagged behind expectations
(Bertoldi, Rezessy, and Vine 2006). Despite this there has been little work investigating how
governance could help to overcome these obstacles or support the transfer of the energy service
model to other infrastructures.
Infrastructure is becoming more integrated physically, operationally and digitally, which can leave it
more vulnerable to failure (Rinaldi, Peerenboom, and Kelly 2001; Zimmerman and Restrepo 2006).
Importantly, operating infrastructure systems in silos, despite this increasing integration, leads to
“financial and operational inefficiencies, a poorer service to citizens and businesses, and unintended
negative consequences” (CST 2009a). This inefficiency becomes particularly apparent when one
considers infrastructure services integration at the end user level; one service may rely on multiple
infrastructure systems. Indeed, the end-user, through technological and behavioural choices, is
responsible for key performance aspects of infrastructure integration. There is a nascent body of
work investigating the challenges and opportunities of physical infrastructure interconnections
within the supply system (Hall et al. 2012; Frontier Economics 2012). However, little emphasis has
been placed on integration of infrastructure at the end user or on integration in operation and
governance.
To address these challenges we need alternative infrastructure operation configurations which are:
centred on the end-user and their demand for services; concerned with implementing resource
efficiency improvements; and take into account multiple utility streams simultaneously. We call
these alternative configurations Multi-Utility Service Companies or MUSCos.
MUSCos represent a significant transition from mainstream infrastructure operation and are unlikely
to occur at scale as a result of the current market-driven approach to regulation. An alternative
governance paradigm is required to encourage and enable the radical change necessary to support
the adoption of MUSCos. However, infrastructure can be described as socio-technical systems as it
3is a complex, interconnected system of technology embedded in society and interacting with public
and private institutions (Unruh 2000). There is an emerging literature related to transition
management: the governance of socio-technical transition (Fischer-Kowalski & Rotmans, 2009;
Foxon, 2012; Shove & Walker, 2010; Smith, Stirling, & Berkhout, 2005). This recognises the need to
consider the co-evolution of technology, end-users, businesses and institutions and their causal
interactions (Foxon 2011). This has yet to be applied to alternative business models, across
infrastructure streams, such as MUSCos.
MUSCos could manifest themselves at a many different scales, which will demand a more co-
ordinated and flexible approach to governance, that encourages and allows multi-level action and
manages conflicts and inefficiencies. This requires a different type of governance to encourage
active participation of end-users and business, align the drivers of these additional actors and to
distribute benefits fairly and efficiently (Dietz, Ostrom, and Stern 2003; Janssen and Ostrom 2006).
This paper combines the findings of existing case study research with insights from theories of multi-
level governance, co-evolution and institutional dynamics to develop a framework to analyse how
governance systems might need to change to accelerate infrastructure transitions. It uses
integrated, service-oriented operation of infrastructure systems as the focus for analysis but
generates findings of wider relevance.
In section 2 we describe the approach to and highlights from case study analysis investigating the
barriers and enablers of alternative infrastructure operation. In section 3 we discuss the challenges
posed by current governance systems to these alternative modes of operation. In section 4 we
consider the contribution of three theories of governance relevant to overcoming these challenges.
We combine the insights from case studies and from theories of governance in section 5 to develop
a framework to improve the understanding of transition to service oriented infrastructure and in
particular the role that governance might take in accelerating this transition. Future work is
discussed in section 6.
2. Case study analysis
2.1. Case study selection and design
We present here a summary of the methods used to derive insights from case studies; the detailed
findings of this analysis will be reported elsewhere. A series of case studies of alternative
infrastructure configurations that incorporate service-based practices have been analysed in detail.
The analysis aimed to identify the interactions between governance, business, end users and
technologies that led to success, the barriers to wider roll-out of the case study and how governance
might accelerate the adoption of alternative configurations.
None of the case studies analysed represent full service-oriented multi-utility infrastructure delivery,
as defined by this research, in particular, the integration of different infrastructure streams was
lacking. However, all displayed some element of the resource-efficient, service-oriented approach
fundamental to a MUSCo. Case studies were selected to show a variety of initiators (including local
authorities, land owners and community interest companies) to fully explore the challenges that a
market-driven regulatory system places on innovative approaches. The case studies are described in
Table 1 below.
4Table 1: Case study summaries
Case Study Description (including main technologies) Location Utility Sector Initiator
Woking Borough
Council
A Special Purpose Vehicle (including participation of the private sector) designed to
save energy in council property and recycle financial savings into low carbon energy
generation (via CHP) and retrofit of social housing.
Woking Energy Local Authority
Olympic Park Energy
Centre
The largest Combined Heat and Power Plant in the UK providing resource efficient
heat to the Olympic park and contributing to the Olympic Development Agency’s
sustainability goals. Now extending heat supply to surrounding developments.
London Energy Government
Agency
Yorkshire Water Water
Saving Trials
Pilot schemes trialling water saving device roll out to provide evidence on water
saving potential in response to OFWAT’s requirements to provide demand and
supply balance and demonstrate action on demand management.
Scarborough
and Wakefield
Water Utility Company
Kimberley Clark Water
Recycling Scheme
“Long loop” recycling of effluent from paper mill re-used as process water following
intensive treatment. No financial driver for investment (water was previously
abstracted from groundwater and discharged to river after settlement). Novel
financing mechanism (piggy-backing on a high payback scheme).
Water Private sector
Eco-Island Retrofit and low carbon energy schemes on the Isle of Wight. Instigated by Eco-
Island Community Interest Company (CIC). Operation of energy generation (small
scale wind, CHP and smart grid) will be undertaken by an ESCo run in partnership
with the CIC.
Isle of Wight Predominantly
energy
Community
Interest Company
Welborne Proposed development of 3,000 house and employment land. In addition to high
levels of sustainability (and updatability), it is proposed that properties and
infrastructure will be managed by the community that occupies the site, in a
manner similar to a MUSCo.
Portsmouth Energy, Water,
Transport
Landowner
5Case studies were analysed using a methodology applying the process of building theory from case
study research described by Eisenhardt (Eisenhardt 1989). The process involves a series of stages to
collate and analyse case study data:
 Selecting cases – using theoretical, not random, sampling to focus on those that are
theoretically useful and constrain extraneous variation.
 Collecting data – using defined protocols and multiple methods to strengthen grounding of
theory by triangulation of evidence.
 Analysing data – to identify patterns within and between case studies to force investigators
to look beyond initial impressions and see evidence through multiple lenses.
 Shaping hypotheses – by identifying evidence for emerging constructs and looking for
replication of logic across cases.
Data collection was undertaken in two stages; firstly, literature related to the case studies was
examined and a timeline created for each case study showing the internal and external factors that
shaped the evolution of the alternative mode of operation. The observed structure of the agents and
assets involved in the alternative mode of operation was mapped and compared with the structure
of a mainstream business. The mapping exercise provided a clearer insight into the relationships and
interactions that contribute to the emergence of the case study within the mainstream.
Secondly, a series of semi-structured interviews was undertaken to develop an understanding of:
 The evolution of internal and external factors that led to the success of the alternative mode
of operation;
 The motivations, enablers and barriers for the development of the alternative models;
 The relationships and interactions of different actors and organisations within the case
studies that that contributed to the emergence of the case study within the mainstream;
and
 The potential to roll out and upscale the case study or to develop them into service-based
utility models.
2.2. Lessons from case studies
Our analysis of the case study outcomes identified a series of barriers and enablers to adoption of
resource-efficient, service-oriented infrastructure operation common to the majority of case studies.
Our focus in this article is on developing a more theoretical understanding of the process of change
and the role of governance in supporting or hindering this change.
Our results highlighted a series of characteristics of successful transitions, which are enumerated
below.
Infrastructure governance goes beyond utility governance: The activities in the case studies were
initiated by a range of actors, not just utility companies, which are the major focus of current
infrastructure governance. The centralised market regulation of the current governance system was
found to hinder activities initiated by alternative actors.
Multiple participants: a key challenge, but also a key to success: The majority of case studies
required the active participation of multiple actors from a range of sectors. For example, the Eco-
Island project required action from international industrial organisations, local businesses, the local
6community and the local authority. When end-users are engaged as a key driver and are central to
the goal of the project it is more likely to have successful outcomes.
Integration of diverse actors: One of the biggest challenges that case studies faced was aligning the
interests of the diverse actors. Once initial interests were aligned a key aspect of success was
ensuring that actors derived benefit from participation.
Multi-dimensional relationships, multi-dimensional solutions: The relationships between these
actors are multi-dimensional, and it is the combination of these relationships that supports
transition. It is important that these relationships do not have contradictory goals. For example,
regulators require water companies to demonstrate activities to encourage demand management
but do not allow them to generate revenue from activities other than selling water, reducing profits
and disincentivising demand management.
Relationships are dynamic: the roles of actors and the relationships between them are not static and
evolved as case studies developed and responded to external pressures. For example, the
community interest company (CIC) at the heart of the Eco-Island development was fundamental in
describing the future scenarios of the island’s infrastructure at the early stages of the project.
However, as the project nears the implementation stages, detailed technical specification is being
devolved to an ESCo, and the CIC will take on the role of the client.
The importance of internal governance: All case studies needed some form of agreement or rules
and ways of working to maintain alignment of interests and ensure that benefits were fairly
distributed. We term these rules and ways of working, and the organisations or actors needed to
implement and monitor them the internal governance of the case study. These internal institutions
need to evolve as relationships and drivers evolve.
Systemic approach to technology change: Committing to technological change altered actor
motivations and relationships, and vice versa, changing actor relationships altered the way
technology was chosen and used. The case studies deployed a range of technologies including; end-
use, distribution and supply technologies. However, these technologies were were predominantly
developed in parallel to the current infrastructure system. Wider roll out of alternative will need to
consider better integration of current and alternative systems.
The case studies show very different characteristics to the mainstream model of infrastructure
operation. The cases have evolved and survive at a small scale, which does not disrupt the
mainstream and is able to circumvent any barriers presented by the current governance system. It is
not clear to what extent these barriers would constrain wider roll out.
3. The current infrastructure governance system
In this section we discuss the extent to which the current governance system is supportive of the
proliferation of alternative business models, such as those investigated in the case studies. For
clarity we begin with our definition of governance. Governance can be defined in many ways, such
as “the use of institutions, structures of authority and even collaboration to allocate resources and
coordinate or control activity in society or the economy.” (Bell 2002) or ”the pursuit of
[infrastructure] development for the wider public good” (Smith 2009). Some prefer to consider
governance as a system of institutions, which are ”ways of structuring human interactions” (Foxon
2011). We consider governance to be a system of institutions which includes organisations, actors
and the rules they develop. It is not limited to the actions of national governments but includes the
7policy developed and implemented by a complex network of non-state actors at international and
sub-national levels (Smith, Stirling, and Berkhout 2005).
There is a case for governance of the infrastructure system over and above that which would be
expected into a traditional economic sector. The services that infrastructure provides are essential
to social and economic development and delivery of these services can have significant
environmental impacts. Governance, usually in the form of regulation and policy intervention, is
needed to correct the market and system failures that would arise in a purely privatised utility
system and to manage a balance between security, sustainability and affordability. The
infrastructure governance system in the UK has evolved in parallel with our physical infrastructure
systems and the practices of users of infrastructure services (Foxon 2011). Its principal features,
relevant to this article, are presented in Figure 1 and described below.
Figure 1: Representation of the current infrastructure governance system. Actors and assets are
represented as boxes. The relationships between actors and assets are represented as directional
arrows. Particular features of interest are highlighted in dashed boxes.
In the UK, there has been a shift from state controlled infrastructure systems towards liberalisation,
private provision and competition (Hall et al 2012). The primary purpose of post-privatisation
infrastructure governance was to introduce competition into the infrastructure system, to deliver
greater economic efficiency and to protect consumer rights (Mitchell 2010). Despite being a
liberalised system, this still represents a very ’top-down’ approach to governance and leaves little
room for diversity and innovation (CST 2009b).
The current governance system is primarily market-led, which was fit for the purpose of driving cost
efficiency and consumer protection but it is unlikely to be appropriate to respond to emerging
issues, like climate change (Hall et al. 2012; Mitchell 2010). Responding to these issues will require
more investment and more innovative technologies and business models (for example Utility Service
Companies). However, these crucial aspects are often under-represented as a result of market
8imperfections, such as information asymmetries and monopolistic competition (Hall et al. 2012). The
market-led regulatory approach can actively constrain more sustainable infrastructure operation.
For example, electricity market design and network regulation can ’lock-out’ potentially beneficial
alternatives, such as development of district energy systems at the urban scale (Bolton and Foxon
2013).
Privatisation of utility sectors has led to the introduction of new actors responsible for the delivery,
regulation and financing of utilities to correct market failures and protect customers. This has
created a complex and fragmented governance structure (CST 2009a). The profusion of actors can
result in duplication of regulation or conflict between regulators. For example the long-term Water
Resources Management Plans produced and signed off by the Secretary of State for the
Environment were not reviewed by OFWAT who instead had a separate requirement for supply and
demand balance planning (Defra 2011). Further complexity is added by the range of scales at which
these issues are governed. Regulators can act at local, national or European level, often showing
little consistency between scales.
Utility companies (for example, HM Government 2012), technology providers (for example, HM
Government 2007) and end users (for example, DECC 2012) are governed separately and their
agency in the operation and transition of the infrastructure system is confined to limited parts of the
system. End users are perceived as passive receivers of information or managers of their own
demand (Shove & Walker 2010). Businesses, other than traditional utility companies, tend to be
marginalised, which excludes the significant contribution of alternative providers, such as technology
companies and local authorities. There is little consideration of their interaction or the potential for
there to be positive interaction, contributing to transition.
These actors are conceived to interact with the physical infrastructure system (or technologies) at
discrete and different levels. End-users interaction with technology is limited to end-use
technologies, and their behaviour is seen to be independent of this technology. Businesses may
interact with either generation or transmission technologies, which are regulated separately.
Some infrastructure systems (for example water and energy) are regarded as private goods, which
has driven the market-led approach to infrastructure governance. However, most infrastructure
systems actually display characteristics of public and common goods (Frischmann 2005). When you
consider the services that infrastructure provides (comfort, cleanliness, mobility) these could be
considered to be non-excludable; all citizens should have access to these services and, therefore
should not be excluded from use. This is reflected, to some extent in the limitations placed on
infrastructure providers cutting customers off, for example the Water Industries Act 1999 prevent
water companies from disconnecting domestic customers for non-payment of bills (HM Government
1999). There is extensive evidence that non-market and non-state actors can successfully manage
natural resources, which are public and common goods (Janssen and Ostrom 2006). This indicates
that alternatives to market-led governance could be effective and that there is a significant role for
non-market actors in infrastructure delivery and governance.
4. Insights from governance or transition theories
The current infrastructure governance system is limited in its ability to support the the acceleration
of adoption of alternative, sustainable, modes of infrastructure operation. New governance
arrangements are beginning to be developed cautiously and slowly but the scale of change
9necessary to delivery sustainable, secure and affordable infrastructure requires change at a much
faster rate. A new approach to governance is needed that will remove barriers to the transition of
infrastructure operation from supply of unmanaged demand towards resource-efficient service
delivery. Governance must create the right pressure for change and support the resourcing and co-
ordination of the response to this pressure (Smith, Stirling, and Berkhout 2005).
Below we elaborate on the contribution of a series of theories to understanding how governance
might better support the system change represented in the case studies.
4.1. Multi-level governance
A key factor of success in case studies was the presence of multiple actors whose goals were aligned,
where there was a strong network and who had shared commitments. This is not supported by the
current top-down and fractured approach to governance and alternative approaches are needed.
The study of multi-level governance is concerned with the changing interaction between different
levels of governance and the engagement of non-governmental actors in policy development and
delivery (Smith 2007). There is agreement that this dispersal is more efficient and that it is desirable
for governance to be multi-level to capture variations in territorial reach of policy and to better
reflect diverse preferences among citizens (Marks and Hooghe 2003). The distribution of
responsibility promoted by multi-level governance is very relevant to our research area, where
change can be initiated by different actors, at different scales and is likely to involve more than one
actor.
There are contrasting views of the ideal form of multi-level governance in the literature which Marks
and Hooghe (2003) have formalised in two types:
Type 1 – well ordered, nested responsibilities at clearly demarcated levels, usually following
territorial boundaries. Responsibilities are distributed between multi-functional institutions and
networks. However, whilst clear demarcation of responsibility is beneficial, it can be undermined by
a breakdown between levels as a result of the varying drivers and capabilities of actors at different
levels (Leventon and Antypas 2012). Type 1 multi-level governance tends to provide a greater degree
of stability and security in policy direction but has been criticised for lacking innovation and
adaptation to changing conditions (Smith 2007).
Type 2 – more fluid and problem focussed, intended to be flexible, rather than durable, with
intersecting membership. Presents more opportunity for innovation and adaptation. There are some
examples of type 2 multi-level governance in the UK, particularly in the former Regional
Development Agencies (Smith 2007). However, it presents significant challenges in communication
and monitoring progress, can reduce the stability of the policy environment and reduces certainty
about future policy and represents a significant change from the current top-down approach.
Type 2 would seem to be more suited to the purpose of delivering the multi-actor approaches we
found in the case studies. The problem-focussed nature of this form of multi-level governance
supports engagement of a multitude of actors across territorial scales and encourages more
integrated and innovative policy (Smith 2007). A type 2 approach identifies three constituent
governance processes: establishing common problem framing; building resourceful actor networks;
and negotiating commitment between different interests (Keeley and Scoones, 2003). These
processes would support the alignment of interests, which is challenging in multi-actor activities.
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One challenge of effective operationalisation of multi-level governance is that Type 2 tends to be
embedded in legal frameworks determined by Type 1 (Marks and Hooghe, 2003) and ultimately
depend of Type 1 authority for their effectiveness (Smith 2007). This is a particular problem in the
governance of infrastructure, where the strategic regulation of infrastructure and markets are
negotiated at the national government level. Sub-national and non-governmental actors have very
little direct control over these issues. This can actively inhibit the adoption of decentralised solutions
that arise from actors outside the traditional infrastructure marketplace (Bolton and Foxon 2013;
Smith 2007).
Multi level governance provides us with some useful lessons to take forward to our framework:
 The importance of developing a common framing of the problem, which requires translation
between different discourses and actors (Smith and Stirling 2006).
 The need to engage private, public and civil society partners in the process of innovation,
business development, community involvement, knowledge production, infrastructure
provision, communication, regulation, market creation and policy (Smith 2007).
 The need for national regulation to allow innovation at different scales and from different,
non-utility company actors (Bolton and Foxon 2013).
However, there are a number of limitations to the application of multi-level governance in isolation
to understanding how governance might better support the system change represented in the case
studies. Multi-level governance is somewhat passive in its approach to analysis, in that it aims to
analyse the characteristics of relationships, rather than understand how these relationships will
evolve and how this can be used to drive change. Furthermore it does not specifically address the
interaction of actors and technology, which is fundamental to infrastructure transition (Foxon 2011).
Nor does it adequately deal with the nature or structure of internal governance of partnerships, thus
we look for additional theories that might explain these phenomena.
4.2. Coevolution
The evolution of relationships and causal interactions between actors and the technology system are
captured in Foxon’s coevolutionary framework, which defines five coevolving systems necessary to
understand industrial and economic change (Foxon 2011):
Ecological systems can be defined as systems of natural flows and interactions that maintain and
enhance living systems.
Technological systems can be defined as systems of methods and designs for transforming matter,
energy and information from one state to another in pursuit of a goal or goals.
Systems of institutions are defined in the framework as ways of structuring human interactions. This
is taken to include, for example, regulatory frameworks, property rights and standard modes of
business organisation.
Business strategies can be defined as the means and processes by which firms organise their
activities so as to fulfil their socio-economic purposes.
User practices may be defined as routinised, culturally embedded patterns of behaviour relating to
fulfilling human needs and wants.
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Each system evolves under its own dynamics but this evolution affects the dynamics of one or more
of the other systems. One element of the framework of great relevance to our case study findings is
the observation that coevolution can lead to the development of joint structures between different
systems (which are analogous to our multi-actor initiatives; for example, the community interest
company in Eco-Island or Special Purpose Vehicle in Woking). These joint structures may remain
stable, and contribute to a long-lasting transition, or might be disrupted by change at the micro or
macro level, as well as internal dynamics. Governance has a role to play not just in supporting the
creation of these joint structure but in minimising disruption at the macro-level (for example by
removing market regulation barriers to district heating systems) to support the longevity of joint
structures.
The framework has particular application to the analysis of the interaction between social and
technological elements within potential transitions of infrastructure systems. Focusing on
identification of causal interactions improves our understanding of the processes by which systemic
change occurs. It allows us to see how technological change can change actor motivations and
relationships, and vice versa, changing actor relationships can alter the way technology is chosen
and used. This is particularly significant in relation to the observation that current actors interact
individually and with discrete parts of the technology, which often reduces total system efficiency.
When actors combine into joint structure there is a greater potential for them to interact with an
infrastructure system in a more integrated and effective manner (for example, selecting more
complementary supply and end-use technologies to reduce the need for storage).
The coevolutionary framework gives greater insight into how decisions made by policy makers and
other actors could accelerate systemic change by promoting beneficial causal interactions,
improving the stability of joint structures and supporting more systemic innovation and deployment
of technologies. However, it does not go far enough to describe how internal rules could improve
the stability of joint structure.
4.3. Institutional Dynamics
The more complex partnerships and differing actors motivations within the joint structures mean
that some system of internal governance is required, which sets out the roles and responsibilities of
different actors. Elinor Ostrom’s work on institutional diversity has provided a great deal of insight
into the diverse arrangements that make it possible to conserve and efficiently utilise jointly
managed resources. This work has focussed on collective management of social-ecological systems
(SES); however, these systems have much in common with infrastructure systems, particularly those
which demonstrate characteristics of common and public goods. We discuss in this section the
potential for the application of Ostrom’s work on self-governance of natural resources to
infrastructure systems.
Ostrom identifies a series of variables that are suggested to affect the likelihood of resource users to
self-organise to manage a particular SES (Ostrom 2009). The capacity to create effective governance
of SES depends on the nature of these variables; particularly how they affect the costs of investing in
better norms and rules and the benefits of self-organising. The variables relate to the nature of the
resource system, the characteristics of the resource users, and the capacity of resource users, in
terms of their autonomy and system knowledge. These variables were developed into design
principles to help understand the requirements of internal systems of institutions required to
support self-governance (Ostrom 1990). These principles were updated by Michael Cox, Gwen
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Arnold, and Sergio Villamayor-Tomas and reported in Ostrom (2009). They represent “core factors
that affect the probability of long term survival of any institution developed by users of a resource”.
The updated design principles are provided in Table 2 along with a brief description of how they
might be applied to infrastructure.
Table 2 - Design principles for collaborative management of resources and application to
infrastructure
Design principle Application to infrastructure
1A. User Boundaries: Clear and locally understood
boundaries between legitimate users and nonusers
are present.
User boundaries may be less relevant to some
infrastructure systems and strict delineation could
result in duplication of technologies and networks. It
might be more relevant to understand
interconnection with other parts of infrastructure
system.
1B. Resource Boundaries: Clear boundaries that
separate a specific common-pool resource from a
larger social-ecological system are present.
2A. Congruence with Local Conditions: Appropriation
and provision rules are congruent with local social and
environmental conditions.
The infrastructure system and service provided is
congruent with the existing socio-technical system
and needs of the end-users.
2B. Appropriation and Provision: Appropriation rules
are congruent with provision rules; the distribution of
costs is proportional to the distribution of benefits.
Agreements are in place for service provided to end-
users, costs of service and arrangements for
maintenance and renewal.
3. Collective Choice Arrangements: Most individuals
affected by a resource regime are authorized to
participate in making and modifying its rules
Actors are able to participate in decisions on
charging, maintenance and renewal of
infrastructure.
4A. Monitoring Users: Individuals who are
accountable to or are the users monitor the
appropriation and provision levels of the users
End-users or organisation reporting to end-users
monitor end-use to ensure agreed levels of service
are delivered but not exceeded.
4B. Monitoring the Resource: Individuals who are
accountable to or are the users monitor the condition
of the resource.
End-users or organisation reporting to end-users
should maintain and update technology to ensure it
is the most efficient.
5. Graduated Sanctions: Sanctions for rule violations
start very low but become stronger if a user
repeatedly violates a rule.
Rules are in place in the event that service
agreements are breached or maintenance is not
implemented.
6. Conflict Resolution Mechanisms: Rapid, low cost,
local arenas exist for resolving conflicts among users
or with officials.
Mechanisms are in place to maintain alignment of
motivations of different actors.
7. Minimal Recognition of Rights: The rights of local
users to make their own rules are recognized by the
government.
Governance of wider infrastructure system needs to
enable joint structure activities.
8. Nested Enterprises: When a common-pool resource
is closely connected to a larger social-ecological
system, governance activities are organized in
multiple nested layers.
The connection between governance of local system
and rules for governance of wider infrastructure
systems is recognised and articulated.
Both the variables affecting the likelihood of self organisation and the design principles for
supporting institutional survival have a high degree of relevance to infrastructure. These design
principles could be further developed to support the design of internal institutional arrangements
for infrastructure operation. They would support the stability of joint structures and increase their
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resilience to external influences. This could also help to guide the structure of external governance
to ensure that disruptions are minimised.
5. Analysing the contribution of governance to infrastructure transitions: a conceptual
framework.
We outline in this section a governance analysis framework that has been developed to improve the
understanding of transition to resource-efficient, service-oriented infrastructure and in particular
the role that governance might take in accelerating this transition. The framework organises
important elements and relationships identified in our analysis of existing theories and in our
empirical research to help analysts examine a diversity of situations. It also provides a
”metatheorectical language to discuss emerging theories of particular parts of the framework”
(Ostrom 2009).
It allows analysts to identify elements or relationships that are absent from a system of interest or
that are constrained by the current governance system. From this, alternative approaches to
governance can be identified that remove barriers to transitions or enable the creation of a
necessary element and accelerate desirable transitions. This governance analysis framework has
been developed to promote a particular transition, to service oriented infrastructure, but it is
relevant to other transitions. The framework is presented in figure 2 and described in more detail
below.
Figure 2: Governance analysis framework
The key elements of the system (the institutions, technology and ecosystem) are analogous to those
used to describe the current infrastructure governance system in figure 1. However, the
relationships between different parts of the system are substantially different. We describe these
relationships below.
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Business and end-users are no longer separate but combine to form joint structures. The creation
and evolution a joint structure of business, end users and often governmental organisations was a
key factor of success identified in case study analysis. These joint structures align the interests and
motivations of the heterogeneous actors, whilst still delivering benefits to all participants.
The scope and role of actors has broadened, including businesses and end users. Many different
types of businesses participate in the transition, including technology providers, data management
specialist and property developers, as well as the traditional locus of utility companies and this
needs to be recognised by external institutions. End users become active participants in
infrastructure system transition.
The joint structures have internal institutions to set the rules of interaction and to make them more
robust to change. These internal institutions maintain alignment of motivations and fair distribution
of benefits and could be developed following Ostrom’s design principles for self-organising systems.
External institutions are more integrated and adaptive. The formation of joint structures is
encouraged and enabled by institutions at all levels. The description of these institutions a ’external’
implies a division between internal and external actors. In reality the same organisation could
operate in both systems; for example, DECC could partner with a private sector organisation in a
scheme, which would have to operate under the policy set by DECC.
The relationships between external institutions and joint structures are reciprocal (rather than top-
down) and dynamic to allow coevolution of governance and joint structure operation. These
relationships support the internal institutions of the joint structure by allowing them to, for example
generate revenue and interact with other joint structures unimpeded. A significant challenge for
external institutions is that the form and scale of joint structures will vary significantly.
Interaction between technology and actors users is more systemic and coevolving. This is moderated
by the joint structures who promote interaction with the infrastructure system in a more integrated
and effective manner (for example, selecting more complementary supply and end-use technologies
to reduce the need for storage).
The ecosystem plays a more central role in motivating change within the joint structure or external
institutions and it is recognised that its state will be changed by the actions of the joint structure.
Finally, the relationships between different part of the system will co-evolve and both internal and
external governance will need to adapt to this co-evolving system, whilst maintaining the focus on
sustainability.
6. Discussion
This paper responds to the need for a radically different approach to the governance of
infrastructure to accelerate a transition to a more sustainable infrastructure system. Case study
analysis has identified a number of characteristics common to successful transitions towards more
resource-efficient, service-oriented infrastructure operation. These alternative modes of operation
are initiated by actors outside the traditional locus of utility companies and the majority require
active participation of multiple actors from a range of sectors. The alignment of motivations and
distribution of benefits amongst these diverse actors is one of the key challenges of these alternative
modes of operation. The relationships between actors are multi-dimensional, dynamic and need to
be moderated by some form of agreement or rules to maintain alignment of interests and fair
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distribution of benefits. Actors tended to have a closer relationship with technology systems and
interact with multiple parts of the infrastructure system.
These characteristics are substantially different to the infrastructure system conceived by the
current governance system. Alternative modes of operation are able to exist within the confines of
the current, unsupportive system only because they are small enough in number that they do not
disrupt the mainstream system. A fundamental change in governance would be required to
accelerate the adoption of alternative models to an extent to which they represent a transition from
the mainstream.
We use these characteristics and insights from multi-level governance, coevolution and institutional
dynamics to develop a better understanding of how the current governance system would need to
change to encourage the transition to a more sustainable infrastructure system (which we define as
being more resource efficient and service oriented). This is articulated as a governance analysis
framework, which organises actors, technology and their relationships to help analysts to examine a
diversity of situations. The purpose of the framework is to support the identification of alternative
approaches to governance that could accelerate desirable transitions.
The governance analysis framework creates a new joint structure, where our multi-actor
partnerships can congregate and create internal institutions to support the alignment of motivations
and distribution of benefits. These joint structures are supported by more integrated, innovative
external governance, which adapts to the evolving nature of the joint structure. The interaction of
these joint structures with technology creates a point of integration across multiple scales and
multiple parts of the technology system. A key challenge for governance will be the fact that these
join structures themselves will occur at multiple levels and be initiated by a range of different actors.
The governance analysis framework has been developed to promote a particular transition, to
service oriented infrastructure, but is relevant to other transitions. It has been developed as a result
of a limited number of case studies but could be tested on additional studies with alternative
transition end-points.
There is a great deal of potential to further develop this framework to improve its application to
governance of infrastructure transitions:
 Further develop our understanding of the joint structure, and in particular the nature of
internal institutions required to support self-governance of infrastructure.
 Undertake modelling of specific parts of the framework to examine the consequences of
proposed alternative approaches to infrastructure governance, for example the relationship
between joint structures and the technology system.
 Apply the framework to analysis of integration between infrastructure systems (such as
water and energy) to identify how governance might support exploitation of cost and
resource efficiencies resulting from infrastructure interdependence.
The framework developed in this article represents the first steps towards developing a new
approach to infrastructure governance to accelerate the transition to a more resource-efficient,
service-oriented infrastructure system. It is hoped that such a framework will ultimately become a
key tool in understanding how to achieve transition to a more sustainable infrastructure systems.
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